Citizens in U.S. metropolitan areas receive goods and services provided by sub-county governments that include municipalities/townships, school districts, and special districts. Beginning with Tiebout, economists have theorized that economic factors play an important role in determining the observed variation in local government structure across U.S. metropolitan areas. Earlier cross-sectional studies have shown that greater variation in the economic and demographic characteristics of residents, holding all else constant, exerts a positive effect on the number of local governments in a metropolitan area at a point in time. Here, we examine the effect that a change in the variation in these economic characteristics has on the change in the number of local governments over the decade 1982 to 1992. We find evidence that in even the relatively short period of ten years, increased variation in household income in a metropolitan area leads to more, or smaller, local school districts and special districts within a metropolitan area. Our findings are consistent with Tiebout's model and offer further evidence in support of the theory that has become the cornerstone of economic thinking on local public finance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work of Tiebout (1956) , a fundamental concern of economists who study local public finance is what determines local government structure and whether that structure responds to changes in the economic characteristics of residents living in a region.
1 There now exists cross-sectional evidence that the degree of variation in the socio-economic characteristics of the population within a metropolitan area, at a point in time, exerts a positive effect on the number of local governments in the area at that point in time. Nelson (1990) , Trueblood and Honadle (1994) , Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Walker (1997) , and Fisher and Wassmer (1998) have all offered results of this type. These findings are consistent with the Tiebout process of voting with one's feet that results in there being more, and hence smaller, local governments when there is greater variation among citizens in regard to the socio-economic characteristics expected to influence their demand for local government services.
Although this type of cross-sectional evidence is suggestive, it is difficult in this form of analysis to control for the historic and institutional factors that have contributed to the structure of local government in a region at a point in time. It would be more discriminate to directly analyze what determines change in local government structure over time. In this paper we explore determinants of changes in various measures of local government structure within the largest U.S. metropolitan areas over the decade 1982 to 1992. We focus on two basic issues. First, how substantial were changes in the number and size of metropolitan-area local governments in this decade? Second, are changes in local government structure explained in part by changes in the social and economic characteristics of metropolitan-wide population?
In short, we test whether residents in metropolitan areas whose population became more heterogeneous (homogeneous) created more and smaller (less and larger) local governments to provide local public services.
This paper contains six sections. Section II consists of a description of a data issue that had to be resolved before this work could proceed. Section III provides descriptive statistics on changes in local government structure and changes in residential characteristics in large U.S. metropolitan areas during the 1980s. The regression methodology is described in Section IV, while Section V contains the regression results. Conclusions and implications are in the final section.
II. THE U.S. CENSUS DEFINITION OF A METROPOLITAN AREA
A metropolitan area, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, consists of a central city and the economically integrated communities that surround it. In part, residents in surrounding cities commuting to a central location measure economic integration. For a region to be designated a metropolitan area in 1980 and 1990, its population had to be at least 100,000 (75,000 in New England), or the population of its central city had to be at least 50,000.
The U.S. Census usually defines a metropolitan area based upon a set of county units. Since counties are relatively unimportant in New England, the Census defines metropolitan areas there as including a central city and the integrated communities that surround it. Outside of New England, the central county of a metropolitan area contains the central city. An adjacent county is included in the definition of the metropolitan area if it fulfills the requirements of a minimum population density and a minimum percentage of residents who commute to the central county. For instance, if the population density of an adjacent county is at least 25 people per square mile, then over 50 percent of its residents must commute to the central county; if the population density is greater (perhaps 50 persons per square mile) then the percentage of commuters to the central county can be lower (in this instance, 15 percent).
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Since 1983, the U.S. Census has defined two types of metropolitan areas: a consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) and a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). A metropolitan area with a population greater than one million, divided into two or more primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs), is a CMSA. Prior to 1983, PMSAs and MSAs were referred to as standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), and a CMSA was designated a standard consolidated statistical area (SCSA).
Tiebout's notion of competitive efficiency in local government, resulting from voting with one's feet, best applies to large metropolitan areas for which there is a strong possibility of multiple residential locations for a given employment location. 3 Thus, it is reasonable to look to large U.S. metropolitan areas to see if over a given time period there are more (less) local governments formed in regions that exhibit greater (less) change in the diversity of the socio-economic characteristics of their residents over the same period. Nevertheless, two difficulties arise when choosing to look at changes in local government structure in general, and the period from 1982 to 1992 in particular. 4 The first results from a change in As the data show, the relationship between annexation and detachment and the number of localities in a metropolitan area is not clear. Annexations or detachments need not lead to changes in the number of jurisdictions. One jurisdiction may annex only a portion of another jurisdiction, only a portion of a jurisdiction's area might be detached, the area annexed might be un-incorporated land, or an annexation that does completely remove a jurisdiction might be offset by a detachment or incorporation that creates one. As the data shows, it is reasonable to expect that changes in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan are less than the number of annexations/detachments by the central city. However, the dominance of annexations over detachments does suggest that the net effect of such a process is likely to be a reduction in the number of jurisdictions at less than a one-to-one correspondence.
Several specific examples from our set of 149 large metropolitan areas illustrate these points.
Charleston Annexations and detachments do change the size distribution of local government in metropolitan areas, even if there is no change (or a smaller change) in the number of jurisdictions. We consider our focus on the number of jurisdictions as an examination of the most aggregate measure of local government structure where there is likely to be the least adjustment. If we find an observed relationship between our chosen aggregate measure and changes in the variation of socio-economic characteristics, even over a short period with only small changes in the number of local governments, then the argument that local government structure in a metropolitan area is endogenous to demand for local government services is likely robust.
As detailed in Table 2 , during the 1980s there were also substantial changes in the degree of variation in household income among the largest metropolitan areas. In the 95 major metropolitan areas where the counties in the area's definition remained the same, the median change in the coefficient of variation for income was near negative 7 percentage points. The coefficient of variation for per-capita income declined in 73 (77 percent) of these areas. The decline in the coefficient of variation was more than 10 percentage points in 37 of the 95 metropolitan areas. This suggests a substantial narrowing of income differences in the majority of urban areas. This may be surprising given the trend during the 1980s towards greater employment in service sector jobs in the United States. But as Madden (2000, insert Table 2 
about here
The decreased variation in income that was common in the largest metropolitan areas is consistent in the world envisioned by Tiebout, holding all else constant, with a decreasing number of local governments. Alternatively, the increased variation in the racial composition of the population in large U.S. metropolitan areas is possibly coherent with an increasing number of local governments. In light of these occurrences, the relatively small increases in the number of local governments are not surprising. In fact, without the population growth over this period and the increasing racial variation, there might have been substantially more annexations and consolidations leading to fewer local governments in U.S.
metropolitan areas.
IV. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Our basic objective is to relate changes in the number of localities in a metropolitan area over a decade to changes in socio-economic characteristics over the same decade and then to test whether increasing variation in these characteristics is associated with the creation of more jurisdictions. The underlying framework between variation in socio-economic characteristics and the number of local governments in a metropolitan area is developed in the model previously described in Fisher and Wassmer (1998) . Their model is similar to models used by Nelson (1990) and Martinez-Vazquez, et al. (1997) . For brevity, we present only a general outline of the cross-sectional model and a discussion of issues important in translating the Fisher and Wassmer model from one explaining local government structure at a given time, to one examining changes in structure over time.
The basic empirical model used by Fisher and Wassmer to explain the structure of local government in a region at a given time is as follows: 
where, G k i,t is the number of governments G, of type k, in area i, at time t.
The focus in this article, as well as in the earlier cross-section work, is on the influence of the variance in citizen's demand for local government services. In metropolitan areas with greater variation in demand for the services provided by local governments, residents are expected to demand and create a greater number of local jurisdictions that can offer the desired variation in services. This is consistent with Tiebout's (1956) notion of mobile and informed individuals who chose to reside in particular community based, at least in part, on its public service and tax characteristics. Because an individual's demand for local government services cannot be observed directly, variation in demand for local government services is proxied by variance in the socio-economic characteristics -income, age, and race -that other researchers have previously shown to influence demand for local government services. The levels of certain socio-economic characteristics are also expected to influence the number of local governments in a region.
If political, institutional, and regional characteristics are constant over the period examined, the differenced version of the cross-section model given in Equation 1 is as follows:
Due to data restrictions, the observed period of change ( ∆ ) used in our empirical analysis for the number of local governments is 1982 to 1992. The observed period of change for social and economic characteristics is 1980 to 1990.
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As discussed earlier, a key issue for our analysis is the definition of what constitutes a metropolitan area over time. Our approach is to compute the change in the number of governments of type k -municipalities/ townships, school districts, special districts, or special districts with taxing poweras the number in the 1992 MSA or PMSA, minus the number in the 1982 SMSA, with both years using the same central city. As discussed earlier, quite different circumstances surround a metropolitan area that has retained the same counties over a decade for its Census definition, and one that has either lost or gained counties. In an attempt to control for these differences, we also include a dummy variable for a metropolitan area whose Census definition expanded in 1992 to include more counties, and another dummy variable for a metropolitan area whose Census definition contracted in 1992. The regression's constant term is included as the base of comparison for metropolitan areas whose Census definition remained constant.
The specific variables that we use to proxy for the causal effects listed in Equation 2, and descriptive statistics pertaining to them, are in Table 3 . Admittedly, our empirical model is rather parsimonious. We rely on the differenced formulation, and the fixed effects it controls for, to pick up the effect of other relevant explanatory variables that would necessarily be included in a cross-section model, but have not changed over the period observed in our differenced model.
To assess the separate effect that change in variation in demand for government services has on the change in number of local governments in a metropolitan area, an essential control that is needed is the change in size of the metropolitan area. We measure change in metropolitan area size by the change in square miles and change in population. To account for any economies or diseconomies of scale, and hence a nonlinear relationship between metropolitan size and the number of local governments, we also include the squared value of the area's square miles or population if either exert a statistically significant influence.
8
insert Table 3 about here In all regressions, we also control for any changes in the size of the metropolitan area's central Also, holding a metropolitan area's total population and area constant, a central city whose population is growing represents a different growth dynamic for the region than a central city whose population is declining. We therefore include the change in the central city's population between 1980 and 1990 as yet another independent factor that may influence the number of local governments in a metropolitan area.
As explanatory variables, we also include changes in three socio-economic variables that have traditionally been contained in economic studies of local public finance as proxies for residential taste.
These are the metropolitan-wide change in real median household income, change in median age, and change in the percentage of the population of primary and secondary school age.
Variation in demand for local government services is measured by variation in demand parameters that are expected to influence variation in demand. Our choice of variables includes variation in income, age, and race in the metropolitan area. This choice is based upon data availability and what has been included in previous studies of demand for local government service. We also would like to control for variation in local tax prices or intergovernmental grants, but no metropolitan-wide information is widely available. Table 4 contains index values for a hypothetical metropolitan area that contains 60 residents and has 9 different frequency distributions of race.
insert Table 4 about here 8 Defined here as at least a 90 percent degree of confidence in a two-tailed test. 9 Another justification for legitimately excluding these variables is they are to a large extent endogenous to age, income, and race. 10 See Mansfield (1991, pp. 53-58) for a description of the coefficient of variation calculation method used.
As given in Table 4 Finally, as discussed in Fisher and Wassmer (1998) , when attempting to measure the influence of demand characteristics on local government formation it may also be important to consider covariance, or how two demand characteristics move together. As discussed in the Appendix, since a standard measure of covariance cannot be calculated using our data, we use a form of correlation coefficient to proxy for covariance among all two-pair combinations of variables used to measure socio-economic variation. The difference in this correlation coefficient proxy represents a change in the co-variation among our chosen socio-economic variables. Tables 5 and 6 contain the result of estimating this dynamic model for the 1982 to 1992 changes in the number of municipalities and townships, school districts, special districts, and special districts with property taxing power in the 149 largest U.S. metropolitan areas. A simple ordinary least squares regression generates heteroskedastic residuals, so all regression estimates use White's (1978) robust covariance matrix. Table 5 contains regression results for municipalities/townships and school districts, while Table 6 contains the results for special districts and special districts with property taxing power. The regression labeled (1) does not contain the variance and covariance measures. The regression labeled (2) includes the variance and covariance measures and allows for a comparison of the effects of this inclusion.
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS

Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here
An F-test of the overall significance of the variance and covariance measures indicates that with 99 percent confidence we can reject the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients on the variance and covariance measures equal zero in the special district and special district with property taxing power regressions. Similarly, though at only about an 80 percent confidence level, we can say the same for the school district regression. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the variance and covariance regression coefficients in the municipalities/townships regression equal zero. Thus, as a whole, these measures of change in variation and co-variation in socio-economic characteristics offer a significant contribution toward an explanation of the ten-year change in the number of special districts, a close to significant contribution to change in the number of school districts, and no contribution to change in the number of multi-purpose local governments.
Further evidence regarding our key question comes in the form of the regression coefficients derived for the change in the coefficient of income variation. Even in the relatively short time period of ten years, Tables 5 and 6 offers strong evidence that increasing income variation within large metropolitan areas contributes to an increase in three out of four of our chosen measures of local government structure.
One of our most consistent results is that increased variation in household income in a large U.S.
metropolitan area leads to an increased number of school districts, special districts, and special districts with property taxing power. A one percent increase in the change in the coefficie nt of income variation respectively leads to a 0.75, 0.91, and 1.48 percent increase in the number of school districts, special districts with taxing power, and special districts as a whole.
In regard to changes in the coefficient of age or race variation, the only significant influence we detected was that a one percent increase in the Leik index of race variation results in a 0.54 percent decrease in the change in the number of school districts. Considering that the average value for this index in 1990 was 0.120 and it never exceeded 0.544, an increase in this index between 1980 and 1990 represents what most would consider an increase in racial variation within a metropolitan area. Holding all else constant, we have found that metropolitan areas that moved closer to a more diverse form of racial distribution, as measured by an increase in the Leik index, experienced a decline in school districts.
Regarding changes in the four-covariance proxies used, the only significant effect was that a one percent increase in the proxy for age and race covariance resulted in a 0.12 percent decrease in number of school districts. Thus, if the movement to a more diverse racial distribution occurred along with a broader distribution of ages, the decline in the number of metropolitan school districts was even greater. These results could be due to discrimination in the ability of racial minorities to form new school districts through breaking up existing school districts, or being mobile enough to form them elsewhere than in their current location. A wider distribution of age in a metropolitan area, if it occurs because of more old people, may also result in less mobility and offer a reason why it further contributes to a reduction in the number of school districts in a metropolitan area.
Several other results stand out in the estimation of our model and are consistent with previous cross-sectional analyses. As expected, an increase in the geographic size of a metropolitan area, holding other explanatory factors the same, leads to more general-purpose governments and school districts, and this increase occurs at an increasing rate. An increase in metropolitan population exerts a separate and significant influence on the number of general purpose and school district forms of local government in a metropolitan area. As population in a metropolitan area increases, the number of special districts (with or without property taxing power) increases, but at a decreasing rate. Change in square miles in a metropolitan area exerts no effect on the change in the number of special districts, or the change in the number of special districts with property taxing power.
With the exception of a one percent increase in the change in central city population resulting in a 0.63 percent increase in the change in special districts, we find no discernable effects of central city size on the number of local governments in its metropolitan area. An increase in central city population, holding area constant, could indicate greater central city population density and a greater likelihood of negative externalities that can be reduced, or positive externalities that could be generated, through the creation of more special districts within the central city. indicate that the newly defined area, with fewer counties, now consists of counties whose local government structure is more established and hence more difficult to alter. Holding all else constant, this may explain our findings that such metropolitan areas have fewer general-purpose governments and school districts.
Perhaps a bit surprising, though it may be due to the short period under observation, we find that changes in a metropolitan area's median age, percentage who are of school age, and real median income exert no statistically significant influence on change in the number of municipalities/townships and special districts. Concerning these socio-economic measures, the only significant effects found are that a one percent increase in the change in median age, or a one percent change in the percentage who are of school age, respectively results in elastic 3.0 and 1.4 percent changes in the number of school districts.
Perhaps slightly older parents in a metropolitan area with more children are better able to use politics and institutions to their advantage for the creation of new school districts that they desire. Also, holding taste for number of school districts constant, more school-aged children represent a direct demand for more school districts if diseconomies of scale play any role in the production of public primary and secondary education.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results included in this article support the hypothesis that increasing variation within a metropolitan area of the socio-economic characteristics commonly thought to influence the demand for local government services leads to an increase in the number of local jurisdictions in that area. Moreover, such adjustments appear to arise even in the relatively short run of just one decade. Our results are consistent with the operation of a Tiebout-type process in which individuals seek local governments that provide a set of local services most closely aligned with their demand. If the desired local government structure does not exist, the process of creating it begins in as short a period as a decade. At the very least, our empirical study indicates that local government structure is endogenous and affected by the degree of social and economic variation in the region. Based upon our findings, we cannot dismiss Tiebout's concept that individuals seek similar individuals to reside with and create local government structure to allow that.
Obviously, additional research is needed before such results can be stated with certainty. One avenue is to examine the details of the process by which jurisdiction numbers change, that is the decisions to annex, detach, and incorporate. Still another is to expand the period of adjustment. Perhaps one decade is too short of a period to observe sufficient change. Though one could argue that if a change in the variance of characteristics that influence demand for local services exerts an influence on the number of local governments in the same decade, then the influence would likely be even greater over a longer period. Miller, 1993 , The Municipal Yearbook 1980 -1990 Change in Central City Population 15,406 (68,140) Miller, 1993 , The Municipal Yearbook Socio-Economic Characteristics 1980 -1990 Fisher and Wassmer (1998) and proxy for covariance in a way that captures in part the degree to which demand variables move together in the region.
For all possible two-pair combinations of demand variables, we calculate the number of standard deviations that the mean for a metropolitan area's demand variable is away from the mean for that demand variable for all SMSAs in the sample. For example, if two demand variables in a metropolitan area are both the same numbers of standard deviations above or below the mean for all metropolitan areas in the sample, then the two demand variables are considered to move together.
The procedure to derive this correlation proxy involves first calculating the average and standard deviation of the coefficients of variation. Next, shown only for the coefficient of age variation (AGECV), we derive the following for each variable, for each of the 149 SMSAs in our sample denoted by i:
AGECV i -AGECV average for all 149 areas R i age = --------------------------------------------. AGECV standard deviation for all 149 ares
To derive the covariance proxy for two demand variables in metropolitan area i, such as age and income, use the R i age and R i inc values calculated from the above equation. Place the smaller of the two R-values over the larger to derive a continuos measure that ranges between negative one and positive one. A value closer to one represents two demand variables that are moving together. A value closer to negative one represents that are moving apart.
